A Dispute with Hill’s Conception of the “New Hume”

Zuzana Parusniková


The New Hume Debate has dominated the interpretations of Hume’s philosophy in the last few decades. James Hill in his contribu- tion in this journal (2011) supports the central claim of the New Hume, defining Hume as an epistemological sceptic and an ontological realist. I raise certain objections to Hill’s views. Some concern the confusions in the definition of realism and, on a more general level, question the meaningfulness of the whole New Hume project. Some concern Hill’s arguments focused specifically on Hume’s Dialogues, in which he claims to have found further con- firmation of Hume’s realism with regard to Causation.


nový Hume; kauzalita; realismus; skepticismus; Dialogy

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TEORIE VĚDY / THEORY OF SCIENCE – journal for interdisciplinary studies of science is published twice a year by the Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences (Centre for Science, Technology, and Society Studies). ISSN 1210-0250 (Print) ISSN 1804-6347 (Online) MK ČR E 18677 web: http://teorievedy.flu.cas.cz /// email: teorievedy@flu.cas.cz