A Person Who Is Merely Looking Does Not See

Jindřich Černý

DOI: https://doi.org/10.46938/tv.2012.157

Abstract


Kuhn defended the so-called relativised apriori. Even if the apriori is not taken apodictically, it still preserves a constitutive function. For there is, according to Kuhn, something more to experience than a simple perception. To put the idea in Fleckian terms, to see is to look and to know. We have to know the meanings of "paradigmatic propositions" in order to have an experience. If all observations are "paradigm-induced", different paradigms are constitutive of different experiences. Nonetheless, paradigms are not wholly independent on empirical input. Paradigmatic propositions are of empirical origin: they are, as Poincaré used to say, "hypotheses erected into principles". The role of empirical input in knowledge is hence somewhat paradoxical: it motivates the part of knowledge that is independent on it.


Keywords


Kuhn; relativizované apriori; instrumentalismus; pravidla; Poincaré

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TEORIE VĚDY / THEORY OF SCIENCE – journal for interdisciplinary studies of science is published twice a year by the Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences (Centre for Science, Technology, and Society Studies). ISSN 1210-0250 (Print) ISSN 1804-6347 (Online) MK ČR E 18677 web: http://teorievedy.flu.cas.cz /// email: teorievedy@flu.cas.cz