Scientific Philosophy, World View and “Tiefsinn”: Husserl’s Three Notions of Philosophy in His Philosophy as a Strict Science

Aleš Novák


Since phenomenology isn’t just a method of philosophical rsearch but also a genuine philosophical stance, Husserl discusses in his famous article Philosophy as a Strict Science from 1910/11 at least three notions of philosophy to demonstrate, what should be considered solely as a scientific philosophy. This may only be his phenomenological philosophy, which Husserl contrasts against both in his time most popular philosophical positions, i.e. the naturalism, and the philosophy of world view. But there is also another ‘brand’ of philosophy that’s being mentioned in his article: the so called “Tiefsinn”. Is it a fourth notion of philosophy, or just the extreme derivation from the “world view”? Not only shall our article answer that question, but also demonstrate Husserl’s conception of a phenomenological philosophy being a strict scientific philosophy in contrast to naturalism as well as the world view.


Husserl; phenomenology; naturalism; world view; scientific philosophy; phenomenological reduction

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