The Growth of Knowledge and Objective Progress
Abstract
Typical feature of the recent developments in the philosophy of science is the departure from classical realism. Linked to that is the rejection of the position asserting the independent existence of nature and possibility of the correspondence between mind and matter. Thus, the basic condition is undermined for conceiving the growth of knowledge as objective progress and as getting nearer to the truth. This position, represented for example by Popper, is being gradually overpowered by various relativistic or internalist conceptions concerning the status of reality, our cognitive faculties and our knowledge. The author views these conceptions as a threat to the rationality of science.
(Non-peer-reviewed essay on the occasion of Ladislav Tondl's 90th birthday.)
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