Worldmaking as an Approach to Scientific Pluralism

Nicole Fišerová



This study discusses the extent to which Goodman’s constructivist conception of worldmaking may serve the needs of scientific practice. I argue that worldmaking should help us retain a common methodological order and a basic framework for scientific pluralism. In this way it should provide us not only with better scientific knowledge but also with a greater understanding of the world in general that would be inclusive of both scientific and nonscientific disciplines. The main purpose of this paper is to show that, if revisited, Goodman’s idea of versions, including even mutually exclusive scientific theories, can aid the gradual progress of pluralistic science. Taking the prevailing criticism of Goodman’s conception into account, I argue that worldmaking can serve as a methodological apparatus for scientific disciplines because it presents a position of moderated constructivism which, thanks to the variable criterion of rightness, offers a way to maintain both relativism and skepticism.


scientific pluralism; worldmaking; methodology of science; constructivism; Nelson Goodman

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